
In assembling this large collection of readings, mostly reprints of journal articles, Professors Feigl and Brodbeck have performed a most useful service. The articles chosen are representative of most of the serious work in the philosophy of science by philosophers (and scientists) in the last fifty years. The sectional headings are: I. Nature of scientific method. II. Philosophy of the formal sciences. III. Space, time and relativity. IV. The logic of scientific explanation and theory construction. V. Causality, determinism, indeterminism, and probability. VI. Philosophical problems of biology and psychology. VII. Philosophy of the social sciences. VIII. Epilogue. The sections of most interest to readers of this Journal are probably I, IV, and VII.

In I there are selections from Bridgman, Carnap, and Reichenbach on operationalism and testability of concepts, as well as Gustav Bergmann and Kenneth Spence's article on psychophysical measurement. In IV there are selections from Duhem, Einstein, Bergmann, Norman Campbell, and Carnap, among others. The excellent article of Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim on the logic of explanation is presented in abridged form. In VII, four of the seven articles deal with history, which would seem to be an emphasis out of proportion to the general methodological importance of the subject. The only article dealing with economics explicitly is Lange's "The Scope and Method of Economics."

The editors state in the Introduction, "Most of the characteristic problems and methods of recent philosophy of science originated around the turn of the nineteenth century." This judgment seems correct, and it accounts for some of the lacunae in the sections mentioned. In I there is no article surveying important recent statistical work on the testing of hypotheses, certainly an essential ingredient of modern conceptions of scientific method. Nor is there any material on current developments in the theory of measurement and scaling. Econometricians will miss in IV any serious account of attempts at model construction (philosophers prefer the term "theory construction") in the social sciences. The discussions are almost wholly oriented toward physics. The most scandalous omission is the absence in VII of any material on the theory of rational behavior in situations involving risk, for here is a subject intimately connected with two pet concerns of philosophers: the theory of induction and the theory of value. The inclusion of a critique of modern welfare economics would also have been desirable.

These criticisms are not directed at the editors, who have done an admirable job, but at the neglect by philosophers of the topics mentioned. Such lacunae in a volume as serious and comprehensive as this one indicate that the philosophy of science is overdue for an impregnation of ideas which are characteristic of this century rather than the last.

Patrick Suppes

Stanford University